The housing crisis and the recession have placed tremendous fiscal pressure on the nation's central cities. Cuts in state government fiscal assistance to their local governments, plus shrinking property tax bases are challenging the ability of local governments to continue their current levels of public services.
Introduction
In early 2011 the media has been full of reports of substantial cuts in public services in many of the nation's largest cities. Mayor Bloomberg of New York City stated that in response to a proposed cut of more than $2 billion in state education aid, he may have to lay off as many as 4,700 school teachers (Hernandez, 2011) . In Houston, the mayor has told her police and fire departments to plan for five percent budget cuts for fiscal year 2012, while budgets for all other municipal services, including parks, libraries, city planning and administration, may face reductions of 27 percent (Moran and Glenn, 2011) . Newark, New Jersey, which has been hard hit by a decline in state aid and a reduction in its property tax base, is facing the prospect of laying off between 800 and 1,500 municipal employees or increasing property tax levies by at least 15 percent (Newark Budget Task Force, 2010).
The economic recession, the depressed housing market, and the fiscal crises facing many states, all raise concerns about the continued ability of large U.S. city governments to function effectively. In a recent survey of city government chief financial officers conducted by the National League of Cities, nearly 90 percent of respondents reported that their cities are "less able to meet fiscal needs in 2010 than in the previous year" and 80 percent predicted that they would be even less able to meet their cities' needs in 2011 than in 2010 (Hoene and Pagano, 2010) .
Maintaining the fiscal health of the nation's major cities is important. Not only does onefifth of the nation's total population live in its 100 largest cities, but the growth and prosperity of those cities is key to the economic prosperity of the nation. Dense urban environments engender agglomeration economies and allow business firms to more easily adapt to changes in demand, to increase the quality of the matching process between the needs of businesses and the skills of workers, and to facilitate spillovers of knowledge from one industry to another. In many cases, these economies of agglomeration are more than sufficient to offset the greater congestion costs in dense urban areas (Ciconne and Hall, 1996) .
The prosperity of cities is not preordained. A necessary condition for the economic prosperity of cities is the existence of effective local governments that provides a wide array of public services at competitive tax rates. Fiscal health is a necessary condition for continued economic growth and prosperity. Public services such as clean water, safe streets, effective schools, well-maintained roads and public transit systems provide the infrastructure for private-sector investments in a city's economy. Cities that fail to provide core public services will soon lose their economic advantage.
The ability of city governments to provide services ultimately depends on the availability of revenue. Like all local governments, city government revenue comes from taxes, from other local-raised sources, such as fees, and from intergovernmental sources. In the United States, the property tax remains the single most important source of city government tax revenues. The Great Recession and the housing crisis have influenced the fiscal position of cities primarily through its impact on revenues. The decline in property values and the rising tide of foreclosures have impacted property tax revenues. Other sources of city tax revenue, namely income and sales taxes, have declined precipitously in many cities. An analysis by the Education Commission of the States found that in fiscal year 2011, 38 states made cuts in their state aid to K-12 education (Griffith, 2011) . Although complete data are not yet available, a number of states' proposed budgets for fiscal year 2012 call for substantial cuts in aid to local governments, including additional cuts to school districts.
Our goal in this paper is to increase our understanding of how the nation's largest cities are financed and to provide a forecast of the likely impact of the recent recession and the turmoil in the housing market on the ability of central cities to continue to provide needed public services to their residents. Parallel to the situation in many states, the major cause of the fiscal problems faced by central city governments is that they face substantial reductions in their available revenues. For this reason, most of our attention in this paper will be on the revenue sources available to city governments.
In order to predict changes in the fiscal condition of city governments attributable to the economic downturn and the collapse of the housing market, we must first develop a comprehensive fiscal data set for the nation's largest cities. In the next section of the paper, we address the major challenges of developing a set of data that allows us to compare the revenues available to large central cities both over time and across cities. In the second part of the paper, we address directly the issue cited in the title of this paper, namely the impact of the Great Recession on the ability of central cities to finance public services. The most recent comprehensive fiscal data on central city finance are for 2008. The absence of more recent data means that in order to assess the impact of the economic and housing crises on central city finance it is necessary to forecast fiscal changes based on patterns of change in earlier years. With that goal in mind, we develop a simple revenue and spending forecasting model and use the model to simulate the impact of the recession on revenue and spending patterns in the nation's largest cities. We conclude with an analysis of the likely impact of revenue reductions on the ability of urban governments to maintain critical public service.
Financing U.S. Central Cities-A Comparative Analysis
The literature on the financing of the nation's central cities is extremely sparse. With the exception of the research by Bradbury (1982 Bradbury ( , 1983 and by Ladd and Yinger (1989) , very few studies have taken a comprehensive look at the financing of American central cities. We suspect that an important reason for this absence of research is the difficulty of putting together a data set that allows for a fiscal comparison of cities on both the revenue and spending side.
In the U.S., the Census Bureau provides the only comprehensive source of fiscal data for cities. Data are collected separately from all types of governmental units, general-purpose municipal governments, which include cities and towns, independent school districts, county governments, and special districts. The difficulty in putting together a comprehensive data set for cities is that cities differ substantially in their expenditure responsibilities. While some city governments are responsible for the financing of a full array of public services for their residents, other city governments share the responsibility of providing services with a set of overlying governments. For example, in Boston, New York City, Baltimore, and Nashville, there are no independent school districts or county governments serving local residents, and thus the municipal government is responsible for core municipal services, plus elementary and secondary education and public health and welfare services usually provided by overlying county governments. In other cities such as El Paso, Las Vegas, Miami, and Wichita, however, only about one-quarter of public spending on local government public services is done by the municipal government. Spending on other services that provide direct benefits to city residents is carried out by independent governments, either school districts or counties, which often serve geographical areas that stretch way beyond city government boundaries.
Given the large variation in expenditure responsibilities among the nation's largest cities, comparisons of both per capita spending and revenue levels across city municipal governments are meaningless. For example, municipal government data indicate that in 2008, Tucson, Arizona, which relies heavily on a local sales tax, collected just 13 percent of its total tax revenue from the property tax. However, when we take account of the revenues paid by city residents to the overlying school district and county government, property taxes accounted for 64 percent of the total local tax revenue paid by the residents of Tucson. Conversely, in Buffalo, New York, 88 percent of city government tax revenues come from the property tax, but because county governments in New York rely heavily on sales taxes, only about half of the total tax revenue paid by Buffalo residents to the local governments that provide them with public services comes from the property tax.
As a means of dealing with heterogeneity in municipal government expenditure assignments and the variation in the organizational structure of local governments across the country, we have utilized a concept that we call constructed city governments. The basic idea is to compile a measure of the total taxes and other revenues paid by the taxpayers of each large city in our sample by including all revenues collected and spending undertaken by the municipal government and by the portion of independent school districts and county governments that overlaps municipal boundaries. This is not a new idea. In a report entitled Composite Finances in Selected City Areas, the U.S. Census Bureau (1974) compared fiscal and debt burdens for the central city and a single suburban municipality in five large metropolitan areas by compiling fiscal data from all overlapping local governments that served the residents of each of their sample municipalities. We fol-low a similar, although somewhat simplified methodology, but apply it to nearly all large U.S.
cities. Katharine Bradbury (1982) , in a comparative study of fiscal distress in U.S. cities, recognizes the need to account for differences across the country in governmental structures that result in differences in city government responsibilities. To address this issue, she calculates the "combined revenue collection in city areas" by allocating to each city area all non-municipal local government revenue within each state on an equal per capita basis. As described in the next paragraphs, our approach is to improve on the use of statewide averages by utilizing fiscal data from each non-municipal government that overlie each central city.
The creation of constructed cities required the following steps. For cities with independent school districts that are coterminous to city boundaries, we combined the school district and municipal values of all revenues and expenditure variables. For school districts that cover a geographical area larger than the city, and for cities served by multiple school districts, we use data on the spatial distribution of enrollment to allocate a portion of total school revenues and spending to the "constructed" city. For each school district serving a portion of the central city, we employed geographical information system (GIS) analysis of Census block group level data from the 2000 decennial census to determine the number of students in each school district that live in the central city.
The next step in determining revenues and expenditures in constructed cities was to add data representing the county government serving city residents. In cases where county governments cover an area larger than the central city, expenditures and revenues are allocated to the constructed city on the basis of the city's share of county population.
1 Appendix 1 provides a breakdown of the number of cities in ten different categories of fiscal relationships with counties 1 Contact the authors for a more detailed description of the methodology used to create our constructed city data set. Some previous empirical studies focusing on the financing of municipal governments have failed to take full account of the impact of overlapping jurisdictions in their analysis. For example, Carroll (2009) utilizes census data to study revenue diversification among all municipal governments with populations above 25,000. She, however, makes no adjustments for variations in expenditure responsibilities despite the fact that her measure of revenue diversification, a Herfindahl index, is quite sensitive to the inclusion of revenue from overlapping, independent gov-ernments. 3 Other studies, for example, Inman (1979) and Sjoquist, Walker, Wallace (2009) , have used dummy variables to partially adjust for overlapping jurisdictions. In their well-known study of the fiscal condition of large central cities, Ladd and Yinger (1989) focus explicitly on municipal governments. Their focus however is not on comparing the revenue of city governments, but rather on their revenue capacity. In developing their revenue-capacity measures they adjust for the capacity "used up" by county governments and independent school districts that overly city governments.
Our data set for this study consists of fiscal data for the years 1997 It should be emphasized that constructed governments are not governmental units and thus they can not be used as the foundation for conducting a traditional analysis of governmental behavior. However, they do provide us with a way of comparing fiscal conditions across American central cities. Moreover, because they combine the revenues from overlapping governments, they can be used to study the horizontal fiscal interactions between governments that share the same revenue base.
Central City Finances in 2007
To provide a foundation for our analysis of the impact of the recession and the housing market crisis on the financing of American central cities, we present an overview of the financing of local governments in fiscal year 2007. 5 Tables 1 and 2 display combined data for municipalities, townships, counties, and school districts-all local governments except for special dis-tricts. The left-hand panel includes data for these governments nationwide; the central panel contains data for revenues allocated to our sample of 109 large constructed governments; and the right panel presents data for revenues not allocated to the 109 constructed governments. Table 1 shows major sources of general revenue and Table 2 focuses on tax revenues by source. Although there were 52,095 general-purpose local governments and independent school districts in the U.S. in 2007, the group of 109 large constructed governments accounted for 25 percent of the $1.2 trillion of general revenue raised by all of these local governments. Table 1 illustrates that on average local governments raise 60 percent of their general revenues from their own sources and rely on other governments for the remaining 40 percent.
The table demonstrates that while the 109 constructed governments receive only a slightly smaller share of their general revenues from intergovernmental sources than local governments serving smaller cities, they receive a much larger share in the form of federal aid and a smaller share from state government aid. Of the own-source revenue of local governments, about two-thirds come from taxes, with user fees and charges and miscellaneous revenues making up the rest. Table 2 presents a picture of the sources of tax revenue for local governments in the U.S.
Constructed governments serving the nation's largest cities rely much less heavily on the property tax than do local governments serving less populated municipalities. The property tax accounts for 56 percent of tax revenue in our sample of large constructed cities compared to 77 percent of tax revenue in smaller cities. In lieu of revenue from the property tax, the large constructed governments rely more heavily on the general sales tax, the individual income tax, selective sales taxes, and the corporate income tax compared with local governments serving smaller municipalities.
Because a few of the largest city governments, most notably New York City, place relatively heavy reliance on non-property tax sources of tax revenue, the data in Table 2 provides an over-estimate of degree of revenue diversification that exists in the average large central city. If
New York City is dropped from our data set, the average share of tax revenue from the property tax rises to 64.9 percent and the share of revenue from the individual and corporate income taxes declines to 5.0 and 0.1 percent, respectively. A more informative picture of the degree of revenue diversification away from the property tax is given in Table 3 , which provides a count of the number of large constructed cities that use each tax and among those cities using the tax, the importance of the tax in total tax revenue. The data show that the vast majority of large central cities do not rely on revenue from either the individual or corporate income taxes. In contrast, all but 3 cities-Birmingham, Alabama; Warren, Michigan; and Milwaukee, Wisconsin-raise tax revenue from selective sales taxes, although in the majority of cities, excise taxes account for less than 10 percent of total tax revenue. All but 18 of the 109 constructed cities raise revenue from the general sales tax, however in only 12 do sales tax revenues generate more than onethird of total tax revenue.
Central City Revenue Changes, 1997 to 2008
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the changes in revenues by source of our One way in which states closed their budget deficits during this period was to cut state aid to local government (Dye and Reschovsky, 2008) . As is well known, during most of this period, until 2006, housing prices and municipal government property tax bases were growing rapidly.
Between 1997 and 2008 total general revenue in our constructed cities grew at an average annual rate of 5.3 percent, with own-source revenues growing at a faster rate (5.5 percent) than intergovernmental revenues (4.9 percent). On average, tax revenue growth exceeded growth from user fees and charges and miscellaneous sources. Among taxes, the property tax grew faster than revenue from general and selective sales taxes. Among intergovernmental sources, state aid grew faster than grants from the federal government. The average rate of change of individual revenue sources varied substantially among constructed cities. For example, the range of average changes in property tax revenue was from an annual decline of 5 percent to an average growth rate of 12 percent. In other years, slowdowns in the growth rate of tax revenues were matched by increases in the growth rate of intergovernmental aid.
In figure 2 , we illustrate the average annual changes in real tax revenues by type of tax.
The clear lesson is that the property tax plays an important role in creating tax revenue stability and in muting to some degree the strong pro-cyclical impacts of the individual and corporate income, and sales and excise taxes. We emphasize, however, that the large negative and positive percentage changes, especially in revenue from the corporate income tax, have an impact on only a relatively small number of cities that utilize the tax (see Table 3 ). Our goal in this section of the paper is to predict the impact of the housing and economic downturns on the per capita real spending in our sample of large constructed central cities. Although the translation of spending cuts into specific reductions in the delivery of public services is beyond the scope of this paper, one indicator of reductions in public services comes from na-tional data that show that local government employment in the U.S. has been reduced by more than two percent over the past 2½ years.
The Housing Crisis and City Spending
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The ability of local governments to finance public services depends primarily on the availability of revenue. Our strategy for predicting central city spending is to forecast the magnitude of the major revenue sources utilized by the governments serving the residents of U.S. central cities. We then estimate an identity relationship between revenue sources and expenditures that incorporates lags between changes in revenues and changes in spending.
City government revenues come from property taxes, from other taxes, from non-tax locally-raised revenues, from state aid, and from federal aid. We focus particular attention on the property tax, the single most important source of locally-raised revenue by American cities. Lags between changes in housing values and changes in property tax revenues reflect the extent to which changes in assessed values lag changes in market value, and also the degree to which to which cities respond to changes in assessed value by adjusting property tax rates. The administrative lag is due in large part to the assessment process in which properties are often not assessed annually and once re-assessed there is often a year lag until new values are reflected on property tax rolls. In addition, assessment caps that have been adopted in a number of states in 6 These employment statistics plus other indicators of the fiscal challenges faced by city governments are included in a March 2011 speech by Ben Bernanke (2011 (2011) use data from individual states to illustrate the several year lag between the peak of the housing boom and initial declines in property tax revenues.
Our property tax prediction model has the following specification:
ln PTR = a 0 + a 1 (ln lagged HPI) + Year Dummies + City Fixed Effects + error,
where PTR is property tax revenue per capita in real (2007) This model, which is quite parsimonious, is not a structural model of property tax revenues. We estimate this highly simplified model because our goal is to predict changes in property tax revenues beyond the sample period, as a function of known changes in housing prices. 9 Differences across cities in the use of the property tax, reflecting tradeoffs between reliance on the property tax versus other taxes, non-tax revenue sources, and state and federal intergovernmental aid, are all subsumed in the fixed effects. Thus, we are in effect assuming that such differences remain constant over the forecasting period. We also tested for whether the elasticity of the property tax with respect to housing values was symmetrical for increases and decreases in housing 8 For example, in California, where Proposition 13 limits the annual growth of assessed values to 2 percent unless a property is sold, sharp drops in home prices for long time homeowners will fail to lead to drops in assessed values as long as market values continue to exceed assessed values. In New York City, by law changes in market value are translated into changes in assessed value over a five year period. The actual rate of phase-in varies by property class (New York City Independent Budget Office, 2011). 9 Lutz (2008) finds that the elasticity of property tax revenues with respect to. housing prices is robust to the inclusion of other covariates. This provides additional justification for the parsimonious specification adopted in our work.
prices, and found that there was no difference. We experimented with various lag structures for the housing price index, and found (as did Lutz) that a three year lag relationship was strongest statistically. The regression results for the estimation of equation 1 are presented in first column of Table 4 .
The coefficient on the housing price index indicates that three years subsequent to a 10 percent decrease in the housing price index for a metropolitan area, constructed government property tax revenues will be 3.8 percent lower in real terms. Table 5 , the average predicted decline in property tax revenues is 3.2 percent.
While the average decline in property tax revenues may seem relatively small, some cities face much larger drops in revenue, while property tax revenues are predicted to increase in a few cities. Table 5 In the second approach, we arrive at a state-specific state aid adjustment factor by using data on individual state budget gaps (again measured relative to the size of each state's general fund revenues). For example, for a city in California, the state aid adjustment factor for fiscal 
Since in the long run, revenue is equal to spending, equation (2) is essentially an identity, with a one-period lag. The lag occurs because most local governments, and especially school districts, maintain fund balances that allow them some latitude in absorbing reductions in revenue without reducing spending. Both the severity and the long duration of the Great Recession and the housing crisis have resulted in revenue declines that overwhelm any existing fund balances.
The estimated coefficients of the spending regression indicate the weights on the various revenue sources in total spending. The results of estimating equation 2 are shown in the second column of Table 4 . Table 6. The table shows forecasts based on the two alternative methods for adjusting state aid, as described above.
The average predicted decline in real per capita spending is about 7 percent. The largest declines in spending are between 10 and 12 percent using average state budget gaps as the basis for the state aid adjustment, and occur in the cities facing the largest decline in property tax revenues. When we use state-specific budget gaps, the predicted decline is 15 percent or more in cities with large declines in home values. The higher predicted decline in spending in the cities with large declines in housing prices under our state-specific budget gap method of forecasting state aid reductions reflects the fact that the decline in housing values and the magnitude of the state budget gap are positively correlated. 12 This suggests that states with relatively large declines in metropolitan housing values also face greater fiscal pressure on state income and sales taxes.
Because we assumed that nearly all cities will face cuts in non-property tax revenue sources, especially intergovernmental assistance, even those cities whose property taxes are expected to grow the most between 2008 and 2012 are expected to face spending cuts averaging about 4.6 percent. For example, while we predict that housing prices in Houston will rise by over five percent between fiscal years 2008 and 2012, real state education aid per student in Houston is more than 10 percent lower in fiscal year 2011 than it was in fiscal year 2008, and it is likely that state aid will be cut by at least an additional 10 percent in 2012. 13 Although our forecasting model predicts state-specific state aid cuts, in some cities that have experienced particularly large reductions in state aid over the past four years, substituting actual cuts in state aid for our predictions will result in larger than predicted reductions in spending.
Conclusions
There is very little systematic research on the fiscal conditions of central cities. While all cities must provide a common set of services to their residents, there is enormous variation in the institutional and fiscal structure of governance in metropolitan areas. In some cities, for example New York and Boston, municipal governments are responsible for a full array of public services, including public education. In other cities, for example Phoenix, municipal governments have limited expenditure responsibilities, while overlying independent governments, principally school districts and counties, provide many services. These differences make it extremely difficult to provide valid cross-city comparisons.
To conduct fiscal analyses of the nation's largest cities, we have developed the concept of constructed governments. Fiscal data for each constructed governments consists of the revenues and spending of the central city municipal government plus the portion of revenues and expenditures of overlying governments that serve central city residents. While the spatial pattern of county and school district expenditures and revenues may not be uniform across space, the available data do not allow us to incorporate such variations. Hence, we assign county fiscal data to cities on the basis of population shares and school district fiscal data on the basis of pupil shares.
With these data, we are able to compare central city finance for the 109 largest U.S. cities, both across cities and over time. We are also able to construct a revenue forecasting model that we use to assess the impact of the Great Recession and the housing crisis on central city property tax revenues and direct general spending. Understanding the revenue impacts of the great recession and its accompanying housing crisis is crucial to assessing the future fiscal health of cities. Central cities provide essential public services to their residents, including in many cases, heavy concentrations of the disadvantaged. These cities also serve as the engine of innovation and economic growth for their metropolitan area. For these reasons, maintaining their fiscal health of central cities should be an important national policy goal.
In the U.S. the only comprehensive source of fiscal data on state and local government public finance are the censuses and annual surveys conducted by the Governments Division of the Census Bureau. Given the inevitable lags in data collection, and the cumulative impacts on cities of the economic slowdown, it will be many years before we are able to conduct a full assessment of the fiscal impacts on cities of the recession and housing crisis. To date, the only information we have is anecdotal reports in the press of public employee layoffs, public service reductions, and cuts in spending and the results of surveys of city financial officers conducted by the National League of Cities.
Using our data on constructed cities allows us to provide a summary picture of the reve- State aid forecasts are based on state-specific estimates budget shortfalls. Other sources of city revenue, including federal aid and non-property local taxes, are forecast using our best estimates of national trends.
Our forecasting model predicts that on average real property tax revenues will decrease contribute to rising resistance to property tax rate increases. In a number of states, such as Wisconsin and New Jersey, the pressure on the property tax from a decline in the base is being reinforced by specific state prohibitions on raising property tax levies to offset losses in state aid.
Second, spending changes are forecast relative to a 2009 baseline, and they do not take account of increases in the real cost of providing any given level of public services. These increases stem from contractual increases in compensation, rising health care costs, as well as increases in the cost of fuel and other supplies. While cities are undoubtedly trying to minimize such cost increases, they nonetheless imply that the real reduction in public services probably exceeds the decline in real spending.
Although state government budgets for fiscal year 2012 have yet to be enacted in most states, budget proposals in a number of states call for much larger cuts in state aid to local governments than in previous years. Coupled with the impact of the withdrawal of the federal stimulus funds, these actions suggest that the drop in expenditures between 2012 and in 2013 may well be somewhat greater than our forecast.
The real impact of the recession and the housing crisis on city residents and public sector employees depends on the way in which expenditure cuts are implemented and on which public services bear the brunt of the reductions. While surveys provide some information on the pattern of and severity of public service reductions, more systematic evidence on service cuts and their impact on residents will be an important question for future research. Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis: *p < .01, **p < .001
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Although not shown, the property tax regression includes year dummies and city fixed effects. Table 7 Predicted Change in Per Capita General Expenditures, FY2009 to FY2013
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